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Abstract
Information Systems have been a key tool for the overall performance improvement of
administrative tasks in academic institutions. While most systems intend to deliver
a paperless environment to each institution it is recurrent that document integrity
and accountability is still relying on traditional methods such as producing physical
documents for signing and archiving. While this method delivers a non-efficient work-
flow and has an effective monetary cost, it is still the common method to provide a
degree of integrity and accountability on the data contained in the databases of the
information systems.
The evaluation of a document signature is not a straight forward process, it requires
the recipient to have a copy of the signers signature for comparison and training
beyond the scope of any office employee training, this leads to a serious compromise on
the trustability of each document integrity and makes the verification based entirely
on the trust of information origin which is not enough to provide non-repudiation
to the institutions. Digitally signed documents provide an interesting solution to
this problem, not only the validation of the document is automated, its integrity
verifiable, but may be implemented in such way that the information contained in such
documents can be directly dematerialized to different information systems without
human intervention allowing cost reduction and leading to faster process workflows.
4
Keywords
Keywords:
• Smartcard
• HSM
• Digitally-signed documents
• Integrity
• Trust
• Long-term archives
5
Acronyms
HSM — Hardware Security Module
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The reputation of an organization is an highly important and intangible asset which
plays an important role in the competitive advantage over other organizations[1]. This
is also one of the key elements that is taken into consideration by the University ranking
models[2], thus stimulating the institution’s attractiveness to future applicants and
directly influencing the final prestige of the alumni’s CV.
While the institutional prestige and ranking ascertain the organization’s data as a
trustworthy resource,this by itself is not sufficient and some assurance about its integ-
rity has to be provided by the institution itself in order to protect its trustworthiness
and reputation.
Information produced by and circulating within the universities comes from a multi-
tude of sources, with different trust parties, trust-delegation and information commit-
ments.This poses an effective challenge when establishing policies that protects the
interests of the institution while at the same time providing sufficient accountability
mechanisms to enforce non-repudiation and commitment.
The information systems in Universities tend to be considered more complex than
their counterparts in similar sized commercial organizations [3] and with the massive
amount of data produced by student evaluations and student records, information
assurance from record creation to long-term archive poses a serious challenge that
must be properly addressed.
When establishing the required degree of information assurance [4] to manage the risks
to the institutions reputation, information security plays an important key role[5]. The
information system currently deployed at the University of Porto takes into account
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authentication, authorization and confidentiality but lacks appropriate integrity and
non-repudiation mechanisms and still relies on the inefficient document as a source of
truth for its most crucial data.
After careful analysis and research of the different problems and inefficiencies of the
current approach, a new architecture and process workflows providing stronger and
better guarantees to information integrity across academic information systems overall
is proposed.
1.1 Motivation
While the growth in complexity and functionality being provided by the University of
Porto information system, centralizing every work task in the institution, namely user
management, course management, professor attribution and grading, transformed the
information system from an ad-hoc tool to the source truth for academic records, the
existing systems still rely on the institution blind trust on the data integrity in the
system databases and paper based records.
In order to reassure that a person with special privileges across the infrastructure is not
able to modify or otherwise manipulate parts of the data, a document copy on paper
is produced, requiring traditional physical verification of the document and of the
imprinted signatures or other marks like seals or stamps. This sort of integrity checks
have some costs and pose a few more challenges as to when and how the integrity is
verified, how to verify forgeries and what early mitigation and fraud detection must be
put into place to mitigate this situations. This materialization and dematerialization of
paper based documents to assure integrity is not only error-prone and cost-ineffective
due to human and supplies costs, but it also requires an extraordinary effort on the
maintenance of huge volumes of paper in archives making early mitigation and fraud
detection highly unlikely.
The evolution of information systems to a purely paper-less environment is the en-
visioned path. It would allow for the reduction of costs, a higher degree of free-
dom, speedier workflow and an extra degree of security by providing external entities
the ability to automatically verify document integrity and easier materialization and
dematerialization of documents in and out of different information systems. By
providing new types of digital documents which can be trusted, a scenario where
different institutions can share verifiable documents and directly import them into
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their own information systems, without human intervention, would not only benefit
the institution but would also provide a useful tool for information sharing across
different institutions.
1.2 Objectives
Huge volumes of documents are produced by academic information systems. While we
can extend our proposals to all the different kinds of documents currently generated by
the system, the main focus are the documents produced during the students grading
process. Due to their transitive nature and to the complexity of implied trust hierarchy
which requires the delegation of trust, creating a trust-chain from the university to
each faculty, and finally to the professors grading the student. By managing to retain
an high level of trust on documents employed in the grading process, the ability to
produce subsets for any kind of document involved in business processes that require a
similar trust chain should be effortless and mainly focused on producing new document
structures that can include the data that needs to be stored.
In this dissertation, we propose an entire subsystem, from the analysis of the implied
structured trust hierarchies already existing in the institution to the development of
the supporting infrastructure, web services, definition of work procedures, document
structures and archival methods.
1.3 Features
The proposed architecture and its implementation touches on the following topics:
• Delegating trust - The process of entrusting an individual or a set of individuals
should retain the non-repudiation property. Since this delegation of trust is not
immutable with time, long-term archive of documents describing this delegations
is required.
• Revoking trust - Trust can be removed from an individual at any time, since a
delegation establish a trust time-frame, revoking trust on an individual requires
an extra document stating that trust is revoked from a specific delegation doc-
ument. Newer document should be able to re-establish trust on the individual.
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• Mutual Non-repudiation - The institution which accepted the document and
the signer should not be able to challenge a document. An accepted document
automatically binds the document to the author and the institution which had
to verify and accept that the author had the ability to produce such a document.
• Proof of authorship - Documents can be produced in context of a workflow
pertaining to a group, the document must bind a specific author to a document
created in this context.
• Trusted-party commitment to produced information - Every document must carry
a trusted-party timestamp. The trusted party should be a third-party outside
the control of both the user and institution.
• Institutional commitment to produced information - Documents stored in the
institution’s archives with valid signatures and third-party timestamps are con-
sidered irrevocably true.
• Data integrity assurance in long-term archives - The data contained inside docu-
ments is duly signed and archived following good practices for long-term archives.
The institution is responsible for producing new signatures for documents which
cannot be externally verified or no longer containing valid certificates.
• Efficient document materialization and dematerialization - Document’s material-
ization should carry enough information for third parties to verify the documents
are legitimate.
• Efficient workflow - The workflow for producing signed documents should be
mostly transparent to the user and unobtrusive.
• Policies enforcement - Implementing a new paradigm for documents workflow
requires a strong policy establishing which documents are required to be digitally
signed and which documents can follow the old procedures.
• Auditing capabilities - Institution archives are required to be recurringly audited,
and preemptively verified against fraud and should have put in place secure
mechanisms to facilitate these tasks.
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1.4 Proposal
This dissertation presents a new approach for the existing information system work-
flows currently in use by the University of Porto, which requires signed documents to
be physically produced, and proposes a paradigm where paper signature requirement is
naturally unneeded. In this new paradigm, it is possible to extend existing verifications
and establish a trust chain between the institution and the document signee that can be
easily verified by third-parties, while maintaining integrity,accountability,auditability
and non-repudiation of the produced documents.
1.5 Application Domain
Dealing with data integrity and asserting trust is a huge transversal problem to
information systems. Although the solution presented in this dissertation is centered
on the university’s information system, the same principles apply to other informa-
tion systems with similar requirements. Taking into account the volatile hierarchies,
trust attribution and delegation delimited by timeframe, staff autonomy and massive
amounts of information being shared with other institutions implying both material-
ization and dematerialization of documents, the general solution devised in this paper
can be applied to information systems with only a subset of these requirements.
1.6 Contributions
The research during the elaboration of our proposal lead to interesting developments
and enabled the possibility to publish two papers while at the same time develop
solutions to some challenging problems.
• Smartcard support in Android
Android based tables are a growing trend around the university campus. Al-
though the initial intentions of supporting this devices, not being able to provide
strong non-repudiation by using smartcards and simply using a software based
solution was a compromise we did not intend to make.
MicroSD cards with secure elements were an obvious solution, but although they
offered solutions based on manufacturers SDKs there was no apropriate solution
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enabling portable code with simple abstraction around Java classes. Android
application developers would need to write code specifically to each microSD
manufacturer.
At least one of the manufacturers were at the time intending to support a
PKCS#11 wrapper in their product and the huge amount of users requesting
gave us the incentive to solve this problem.
The method for porting the required tools and providing a simple abstraction
to the Android Java virtual machine enabling the use of Java keystores with the
secure element present in the MicroSD card was published in a paper[6] at the
CISTI2012 conference.
• Document sharing format
With the analysis of the standard methods for sharing information across European
institutions during mobility exchange programs, a new type of document was
devised and a paper[7] published at the EUNIS conference.
• XaDes Support for Signserver
PrimeKey’s signserver[8] did not support XaDeS and due to the opensource
nature of the project, we have developed a module that enables signing and
validation workers for XaDeS. This functionality was highly requested in the
project forums and we have therefore produced a patch that was later adopted
by PrimeKey’s development team and integrated into current releases.
During the test phase of the developed module, while cross-validating the pro-
duced signed documents with a different library (Componentes de Firma) created
by the Spanish government, a bug in the document validation[9] was identified
and reported to the library developers.
• PDF Signature Applet
Following the needs to improve the trust-ability of documents in exchange pro-
grams, an applet providing the ability to sign PDF documents in SIGARRA was
developed.
This Java applet provides the ability to create a visual representation of each
signature, where each specific document tag is found. The first document signer,
before performing the signature parses all the information system internal tags
and generates the according signature fields, enabling external entities to perform
easy signatures using different tools.
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1.7 Outline
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows:
The description of the current state of the information system in chapter 2, not only
describes the current workflow but identifies risks to data integrity and trustworthiness.
Exploring the institutional hierarchies and implied trust chain provides insight into
the main problem with trust delegation.
Chapter 3 contains the technical background required for understanding the architec-
ture and design of our solution. The solution is proposed in chapter 5 along with the
analysis of each problem identified and their associated solutions to mitigate the risks
introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 6 focus on the implementation of the changes to the
information system to support the proposed solution, with an overview of the main
architecture, components and the software needed to support these changes.
In chapter 7 we explore the difficulties that arose during implementation, as well as the
derived proof of concept and effectiveness of the proposed solution in fraud detection
and its mitigation.
Chapter 2
Information system at the
University of Porto
In this chapter we succinctly describe the current information system in production
at the University of Porto and the tools that will play an important role in the
development of the proposed solution. While many of these tools are already developed
and in use, due to the specificity of our environment, with shifting hierarchies of trust.
We also describe a new subsystem that provides the infrastructure needed to delegate
trust and the trusted signee a platform to perform digital signatures that plays a
crucial rule on creating an Institutionally trusted document archive that can maintain
its long-term integrity and accountability even when assuming that some elements of
staff can not be fully trusted.
2.1 Information System
The information system currently in use was created in 1992 and it has been under
development until today. While its first version in 1992, developed by the rectorate,
had the main objective of managing student records in the faculty offices, by 1996 an
integrated system with web interface was developed thus setting the path to provide
a web oriented information system [10].
While in the following years huge improvements and new functionalities have been
developed [11], this information system was still not being used by the entire academic
community, and it was not until the year 2003 that this information system, denom-
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inated SIGARRA, spread to most faculties transforming itself from an important tool
for academic records management into the truth source of academic achievements
itself. The spread of the information system across every faculty in the University of
Porto created the opportunity to develop solutions extendable to the entire university,
allowing information sharing across the entire institution and providing the framework
to move the entire grading workflow to a paperless environment.
Since the information system has a huge set of functionalities unrelated to our object-
ives,only a subset of functionalities related to the management of academic records
are described in the following subsections which provide some insight on the changes
required to implement grading document’s signature and establishing their allowed
signees.
2.1.1 Database
The U.PORTO Information System is supported by an Oracle SQL relational data-
base. Data is added to the database via the application layer of the information system,
the information is recorded and simultaneously logged with timestamp values and in-
formation about the user who interacted with the system. All changes to the database
are recorded in the change logs of DBMS, enabling auditability mechanisms[7].
2.1.2 Document’s Dematerialization
Materialization and dematerialization of documents is a very important process in
the university workflow. When considering separate instances of the information
system and documents moving across institutions, easy document materialization
and dematerialization between different instances of the information system becomes
important.
Verifying a physical document integrity is not a simple process, as it requires the
verifier to have a pristine copy of the signature for comparison and trusted documents
containing the university stamp to compare stamp features. This poses yet another
problem, staff training to spot signature forgeries is nonexistent and a time-consuming
task[12], leading to a huge effort in the verification of documents in transit between
information systems or, in the worst scenario, the non-verification of their integrity.
In order to address the difficulties with information sharing across different institu-
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tions participating in a student exchange programs, Europass guidelines have been
drafted[13] in an attempt to standardise the document format used in such exchanges.
The Europass specification is divided into 5 different types of documents:
• Curriculum Vitae - Document defining a curriculum vitae structure for the
presentation of an individual’s qualifications and competences
• Mobility - Document recording study periods abroad in an exchange program.
• Diploma Supplement - Document supplying information on its holder’s educa-
tional achievements at higher education level.
• Certificate Supplement - Document describing the competences and qualifica-
tions corresponding to a vocational training certificate
• Language Passport - Document providing individuals with the opportunity to
present their language skills.
The main focus is on the three types of documents that are issued to citizens by
competent organizations, namely the Europass Mobility, the Europass Certificate
Supplement and the Europass Diploma [14] which has been jointly developed by the
Council of Europe and UNESCO [15].
In the context of information sharing across different institutions, document mater-
ialization is as important as document dematerialization.An effective solution must
enable the ability to import materialized documents to new information systems,
preserving the integrity verifications and document structure as well as the human-
friendly form. Document types that provide such flexibility have been presented
at EUNIS[7] which can help shape the standard for document sharing among the
European partners .
2.1.3 Risks to data integrity
In this current information system, the database does not adequately separate domains
of trust [16] and the database administrators as well as every member of staff which has
privilege in the information system servers have the power to modify and manipulate
any data related to student records, effectively positioning themselves as a trusted
party in the institutional trust chain and increasing responsibility and accountability
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in the staff. Also, any intrusion to the information system or its databases may result
in changes to the information pertaining to student academic information that would
be almost blindly trusted by the institution except for a manual verification of the
paper trail which, obviously, has associated costs.
When moving away from a paper-backed environment, the threat posed by a lack of the
separation of trust-domains is not exclusive to whomever has the ability to manipulate
the data, but the simple possibility of offering a degree of distrust in the integrity
of the data allows the issuer of each grade the ability to repudiate the previously
submitted information, thus subverting the required non-repudiation property on a
trusted information source.
2.2 Trust
The concept of ”Trust” derives mainly from the social sciences and can be defined
as the degree of subjective belief about the behaviors of a particular entity[]. Trust
is also context-dependent coexisting at different levels even between the same agents
within a collective.
Huaizhi [17] defines trust as a measure on the belief that an entity is capable of
performing reliably, dependably, and securely within a certain context. Trust man-
agement has traditionally been described as a special case of risk management and clas-
sified as evidence-based trust management and monitoring-based trust-management.
Although there is so debate about the notion of transitivity and unintentional trans-
itivity in trust [18], under certain semantic constraints, trust can be transitive [19],
given that a trust referral mechanism preserving the context in which trust given is
used.
2.3 Hierarchy and trust
The University of Porto is comprised of fourteen faculties and a business school,
providing a large variety of courses which covers the whole range of study areas
and all levels of higher education. The schools of the University have administrative
autonomy, and this organizational separation creates the need to ensure that the
information systems maintain local particularities and allow administrative processes
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to be dematerialized contemplating the structures defined in the University hierarchy.
In heterogeneous academic environments such as this, a technological solution must
enable the transfer of University’s organizational hierarchies to the digital world,
ensuring for example that the documents electronically generated are digitally signed
and retain the required hierarchical dependence.
When replicating such hierarchical dependence, trust has an implied transitive nature.
Trust is delegated not uniquely on an individual but also for each task within a given
time-frame. While tasks can be entrusted to an individual, they can also be delegated
to a set of individuals that can only produce a valid document by cooperation.
Establishing and maintaining this degree of flexibility in trust chains requires deep
changes into the information system and associated workflows, the definition of do-
mains and sets of trust for each task while producing tamper-evident documents
and providing non-repudiation properties to protect both sides of the trust chain.
Recreating this institutional trust hierarchy which may not be known to external
entities requires that all the final signed documents available to external entities must
contain the signature of the most trusted signee, namely the institutional signature
being provided by the digital signature services and the timestamp obtained from an
external entity as to offer non-repudiation by the university itself.
2.3.1 Role attribution as delegation of trust
The production of any trusted document requires the ability to assert if the requester
has been entrusted with the ability to generate a document for the given intent.
While authentication and authorization play an important role on the production
of documents, the policy establishes that documents must be materialized and signed.
This requirement arises from the fact that authentication does not assert identity by
itself thus enabling the non-repudiation of documents. When authorizing a user to
produce any given set of documents such as grading terms, a legally binding document
entrusting individuals this ability must be produced.
While multiple frameworks have been defined for cascade delegation[20] [21] and
specifically hierarchical delegation tokens[22], in order to preserve the real-life im-
plied hierarchies and multiple delegations with respective storage in trusted long-term
archives, a new set of documents representing the trust delegation have to be created.
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2.3.2 Student Evaluation
The current grading process in the information system can be described by the series
of events required to produce a grading record as described in Figure 2.1.
The academic services create a term for each evaluation period, distributing that term
to the professor responsible for each curricular unit. When entrusted that term, the
professor proceeds with the grading of each student present in the document and
submits it to the academic services again where the information would be validated
and registered. After this process of validation, this document is sent to the professor
back again who signs the document committing himself to its content and sends it
back to the academic services for archival, at which point the student classifications
in the information system are considered final.
Figure 2.1: Lifecycle of grading record
The process described above, assures that both authentication and authorization are
valid in the information system and asserts the user’s identity when physically signing
the document thus offering non-repudiation from the signer, effectively committing
himself to the produced document.
As previously specified, the level of complexity of the information system’s workflow
as a whole creates the necessity of reducing the set of functionalities as to subdivide
our problem by employing a divide-and-conquer strategy. Providing a flexible enough
solution to the intricacies of the grading problem and defining a model to the largest
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trust-delegation chain in the information system inherently solves some of the less
complex workflows not requiring such a long-term validity. Using the same approach
provides an anchor-point to a general solution that can be applied in the most general
contexts.
2.3.3 Risks in the grading process context
The grading process as described in the previous subsection takes effort on legally
binding the document to the issuer, mitigating some of the risks by requiring a
presential signature after the document is materialized. The problem with this method
arises from the necessity of long-term validity in archived documents.
While document signatures are validated when issuing a document, not only the cross-
validation between the archived documents and the data contained in the information
system is rarely done mainly because the verification of signatures is a complex time
consuming process which requires a level of expertise not in the scope of staff training.
This loss of trust in the archived information over time creates serious risks that have
to be addressed:
• Forged documents, if present on the archives, might therefore be considered valid
and trusted by the institution services.
• Non-repudiation of old documents by the issuer
• Mismatch of information contained in the archives and in the information system
not detected
• Grade certification issued relying on an untrusted source
Mitigating these risks while maintaining the same workflow is an inefficient costly
process. Even the simpler cross-validation between archives and the information
system would require staff training to spot forgeries, adding complexity to the process
and eventually, delays.
Chapter 3
Technical Background
3.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is a cryptographic scheme that relies on a pair of asymmetric
keys for the crypto operations. Although the keys are mathematically related, the
private key cannot be easily deduced from the public key. Both keys have different
purposes, while the public key serves as the encryption key, the private key is used as
decryption key.
The public key encryption scheme must retain two properties :
• Completeness
The encryption function and decryption function are inverses.
Given any message and a key pair (k1,k2):
Ek1(Dk2(m)) = Dk2(Ek1(m)) = m
• Semantic Security
The encryption of different plaintext is computationally indistinguishable.
Since the public keys used for encryption cannot be used to deduce the private key,
the public key can be as its name indicates published without affecting the security
of the scheme. This provides a solution to the requirement of secret key sharing in
symmetric encryption, allowing anyone with access to the public key to effectively
encrypt data only decipherable by someone who has access to the private key.
15
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Although it is not necessary to exchange secret keys, the security of the encryption
scheme has to rely on the trustworthiness of the obtained public key as pointed out
in Diffie and Hellman’s seminal paper [23] .
The necessity of trusting the distribution of private keys to different actors is solved
by using a Public Key Infrastruture.
3.1.1 Public Key Infrastructure
A public key infrastructure is responsible for certificate storage and management. It
provides the ability to issue, revoke, store, retrieve and assert trust on certificates
by introducing the concept of Certification Authority. A certification authority, also
known as CA, is a trusted entity which has public certificates pre-shared with different
software vendors (root certificates) and it retains the ability to sign other certificates
using its private key, extending their trust to the signed certificate by creating a chain
of trust. Having such an important role in asserting the trust to other certificates, the
CA has a central role in a Public Key Infrastructure by leveraging its trustworthiness
and reputation. A certification path, also referred as a trust chain, is the list of certi-
ficates used to authenticate an entity. The verification process of the trustworthiness
of a certificate is determined by verifying the authenticity and trustworthiness of all
the previous certificates confiding trust as described in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.1: Certificate validation in a trust chain
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3.1.2 Digital Certificates
A certificate, as defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, is a document containing
a certified statement especially as to the truth of something. Different properties help
verify the identity of the certificate holder (signature, photograph) and embedded
security features establish the integrity of the document thus offering a degree of
protection against forgeries. Digital certificates are therefore the digital equivalent to
their physical counterparts. Actually they serve as containers to bind a public key
with an identity or a set of attributes.
The X509v3 certificate commonly used in SSL contains the following attributes:
• Version - The version field contains the version of the certificate. The original
1988 version has the value of zero. This field facilitates the implementation of
changes in the certificate format over time.
• Serial Number - This field contains an unique identifier for each certificate
generated by the issuer. The issuer is therefore responsible to guarantee that
no colliding certificates (with same serial numbers and Distinguished Name) are
generated.
The serial number is used when identifying revoked certificates in a Certificate
Revocation List.
• Signature - This field identifies the algorithm used by the Certificate Authority
to sign the certificate.
• Signature Value - The signature value contains a digital signature computed
upon the ASN.1 encoded certificate.
• Issuer - The issuer name provides a representation of it’s issuers identity in the
form of a DN. The issuer name is used to select the appropriate issuer in order
to validate a certificate.
• Validity - Identifies the duration interval in which a certificate is considered valid
by carrying a pair of date and time indications.
• Subject - The subject identifies the entity associated with the public key stored
in the subject public key field. The field must contain an X.500 distinguished
name.
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• Subject Public Key Info - This field contains the public key and the identification
of the algorithm with which the key is used.
• Issuer unique ID - This field must only appear on versions above two and should
not be used. This identifier permits disambiguating certificates with identical
issuer names.
• Subject unique ID - This field permits the disambiguation of certificates with
identical subject names.
• Extensions - This field must only appear in version 3 of a X509 certificate.
If present, contains a sequence of one or more certificate extensions. This
additional extensions provide the methods for associating additional attributes
with users and public keys and for managing a certification hierarchy.
The certificate signature determines that the certificate was vouched for, and it is only
able to guarantee that the signed identity information is bound to the specified public
key.
Asserting the security of private keys at all times is obviously infeasible, so mechanisms
able to revoke the digital certificates are required.
In RFC 5280 [24] two states of revocation are defined:
• Revoked - This is a final irreversible state. The certificate is considered no longer
trusted and will be present in all future certificate revocation lists
• Hold - This is an intermediary state. The certificate is invalidated temporarily
and may be removed from further revocation lists if requested.
There are many reasons to revoke a certificate and they can be specified in the
revocation entry:
• unspecified - unspecified reason for certificate revocation.
• keyCompromise - the private key of the certificate was compromised.
• cACompromise - the private key of the certificate issuer was compromised.
• affiliationChanged - the certificate subject does no longer correspond to organ-
ization.
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• superseded - A new certificate replaces the certificate.
• cessationOfOperation - The certificate subject does no longer require the certi-
ficate.
• certificateHold - the certificate is revoked temporarily.
• privilegeWithdrawn - privileges granted to the certificate’s subject have been
withdrawn.
• aACompromise - it is known or suspected that aspects of the Attribute Authority
validated in the certificate have been compromised.
When validating a certificate, verifying its revocation status can be achieved using
different methods: using a certificate revocation list containing a list of certificate
serial numbers parsed by the verifier, or using the Online Certificate Status Protocol.
This protocol uses ASN.1 encoded messages communicated over the HTTP protocol
to return the status of the certificate.
3.1.3 Digital Signatures
A Digital Signature is a mathematical scheme based on asymmetric cryptography used
to demonstrate the authenticity of a digital document, by relying on a private key
for generating a signature of the document which can be verified by the public key.
Establishing the document’s authenticity implies the properties of non-repudiation
,authentication and integrity are satisfied.
• Authentication - Authenticating the sender of a message or document with a
high degree of confidence is important in some occasions. In digital signatures,
when a given key is bound to a user, the authenticity of origin can be established
with a digital signature.
• Integrity - To guarantee that each message or document is not altered in transit
and assure the accuracy of the information. Digital signatures intend to provide
this degree of confidence on data integrity by using cryptographic hashes, relying
on the computationally infeasibility of generating data with the same hash
values.
• Non-Repudiation - This property assures that an entity that signed a given
message is bound to it and cannot in a later stage deny having signed it.
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3.2 Smart-card
A smart card is a device that contains an embedded integrated circuit chip. Although
they are usually associated with their most common types, the smart card with
embedded secure micro-controllers, there are different kinds of smart cards available,
providing simple I/O functions or supporting on-card functions such as encryption
and mutual authentication and interacting with the reader using specific protocols.
When dealing with micro-controller smartcards, the ability to generate and store
certificates in a tamper-proof environment with irrecoverable keys inside the secure
element and perform on-card functions provides an effective control of the keys used in
cryptographic operations or other cryptographic objects being stored in the smartcard
filesystem. This ability to ensure that keys cannot leave the card, provides an effective
means to ensure non-repudiation.
3.2.1 Portuguese National Identity Card
The Portuguese National Identity Card [25] is an EAL4+ compliant smart card re-
taining the ability to produce qualified signatures. The smartcard contains a micro
controller supporting the latest Java Card version, and a 64K EEPROM supporting
on-card cryptographic functions:
• Signature and Verification of 1024 bit RSA
• DES and 3DES
• MD5
• SHA1 and SHA256
• Message Authentication Code (MAC)
The certificates contained in the card (Authentication and Signature certificates) are
issued by the respective sub-certificate authority. The sub-certificate authorities are
branches of the Common Certificate Authority for the Portuguese government.
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Figure 3.2: Portuguese Government certification chain
In respect to security, the smart card is known to be resistant to different known
attacks on smartcards like Hardware Attacks, Timing Attacks, Simple Power Analysis
and Differential Power Analysis [25].
3.2.2 University of Porto Smartcard
The University of Porto identity card is an Optelio Contactless D32 R5, PayPass
certified smartcard produced by Gemalto [26]. Complying with the Javacard 2.2.1,
the smartcard contains a Cryptographic co-processor and a 32K EEPROM providing
a dual-interface both contact and contact-less.
The contact interface complies with ISO7816 standard, supporting both character and
block level transmission protocols (T=0 and T=1).
The contact-less interface complies with ISO 14443 -2,-3 and -4 standards, operates
at a frequency of 13,56 MHz and includes a Mifare 4K emulation.
The Optelio smartcard supports RSA (up to 2048 bits), DES/3DES and SHA-1
cryptographic algorithms and contains different installed applets, namely:PayPass
M/Chip4 (Mastercard)[27], VSDC2.7.1 (Visa), DualVSDC (Visa), Classic IAS V3
(GemSAFE) (PKCS#11 PKI application), WG10 and Welcome Realtime (WRT) XLS
V7 (Xena).
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 22
3.2.3 University of Porto Certificates
The University of Porto smartcards come uninitialized and do not contain previous
certificates, thus relying on Terena as a Certificate Authority to issue signed certificates
for advanced digital signatures. To support self-service card-initialization,an Applet
which matches the user to its Portuguese Identity card using the card authentication
certificates provides the users the ability to request a signed certificate for their role
inside the institution. By requesting the users to authenticate themselves with a
government issued ID and assuming these are registered users at the university, the
applet can bind both identities (citizen’s and user) and allow a new certificate to be
requested and immediately imported into the smartcard.
Figure 3.3: Terena Personal certificates chain
3.3 XML
The Extensible Markup Language or XML is a markup language defining a set of
rules to encode documents in both human and machine friendly format. Derived from
SGML and defined in the XML 1.0 specification by the W3C, the XML provides a
very flexible text format. Using the XML document’s flexibility we can replace the
entire relational database scheme with a XML-centric database containing signed XML
documents as described in section 3.4.
3.3.1 XML signatures
XML Signatures are digital signatures defined for the XML document format in the
xmldsig namespace providing integrity assurance, message authentication and signer
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authentication for any kind of data objects.
The message integrity is guaranteed by the computation of a a message digest using a
cryptographic hash algorithm and the difficulty of finding two meaningful collisions of
messages, ensuring that an attacker could not change the message without breaking the
digest. Although the digest reflects message tampering, a message could be modified
in transit and a corresponding hash computed for the modified message.
In order to guarantee that the digest cannot be modified after the message is signed,
the digest value is encrypted with the private key of the sender. Using the public key
available from the sender public certificate, the recipient of the message can decrypt
the digest and verify the message.
The XML signatures can be present in the same document as enveloped, enveloping
or outside the document (detached signature).
• Enveloping - The signature wraps the signed elements. In this method the
signed elements appear inside an Object tag inside the signature element and
are identified using a Reference.
• Enveloped - The signature is produced inside the element that contains the data
to be signed. Producing this signature types requires a special care not to include
the signature fields when calculating the signature value.
• Detached - Detached signatures, as the name implies, sign elements that are
external to the signature element. This signatures can also be present in the
same document but having both the signature element and signed element as
siblings.
3.3.2 XML Canonicalization
Digest algorithms are agnostic to the XML syntax and work over a sequence of bytes.
This unawareness of the syntax implies that two syntactically equivalent messages will
produce two different signatures.
Line endings, for instance, are represented in a platform-dependent way, producing
different XML representation in different architectures and obviously, different message
digests.
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Figure 3.4: Linefeed signature mismatch
In order to address the problem of serializing XML documents and inadvertently
producing different documents, a Canonicalization Specification proposes a trans-
formation denominated canonicalization that standardizes the document to a single
serialized representation. The canonicalization takes a well-formed document and
produces a syntactically equivalent XML document and further canonicalizations
would always produce the same document. To produce a canonical form, a set of
rewrite rules must be defined which, when applied in any order the result is always a
canonical form,Table 3.1 presents such a set of rewrite rules.
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Table 3.1: Canonicalization scheme for a XML document
Possible Variations Canonicalization
Character Encoding Convert to UTF-8 if any other encoding is
used.
Character sequence used for line
breaks
Standardize to #xA (line feed).
Optional XML declaration Remove.
Optional DTD declaration Remove.
Character references Expand character references.
Use of CDATA sections rather
than escaping special characters
Replace all CDATA sections with the equi-
valent character content. Special characters
are replaced with character references.
Use of empty element tags Replace all empty tags with a start/end tag
pair.
<a/> replaced with <a> </a>
Whitespace within tags Remove.
< a > replaced with <a>
Whitespace before the root ele-
ment and after the end of the
document
Remove.
Whitespace in element content Retain.
Choice of quotations marks in
attribute values
Always use double quotes to delimit attrib-
ute values.
Single quotes (’) replaced with double quotes
(”).
Attribute values Use attribute value normalization defined in
XML specification.
Default attributes Add all missing attributes for which default
values are available.
Attribute order Sort all attributes by their namespace URI
and local names in lexicographically ascend-
ing order.
Attributes with no namespace come first.
Namespace nodes come before other attrib-
utes, and the default namespace node comes
first.
Namespace declaration Normalization depending on either inclusive
or exclusive canonicalization specification.
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 26
The rules defined in Table 3.1 can be applied in any order producing a document in
canonical form. Although most of the rules are easily applied, the namespace declar-
ation canonicalization introduces two different possibilities for rewriting namespaces,
inclusive or exclusive canonicalization.
3.3.2.1 Inclusive and Exclusive canonicalization
Extracting a document subset and inserting it into a different context may cause
problems with signatures because canonical XML includes the document’s ancestor
namespace declarations and attributes within the XML namespace. Take for instance
a document in canonical form:
<set>
<element>example</element>
</set>
The document subset can be encapsulated in an envelope.
<envelope xmlns="http://www.example.pt" xml:lang="pt">
<set>
<element>example</element>
</set>
</envelope>
When inclusive canonical form is obtained from the enveloped document, the docu-
ment is a little bit different:
<set xmlns="http://www.example.pt" xml:lang="pt">
<element>example</element>
</set>
The original document does not have the same canonical form even though it is the
same document thus having a different digest.
While inclusive canonicalization includes the the context of the subset’s ancestors ,
and in order to address the previously identified problems, exclusive canonicalization
was devised.
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In exclusive canonicalization, namespace declarations and the attributes in XML
namespace of a a subset ancestor are excluded from the canonicalization process.
Taking the previously described example, the canonical form of the enveloped set
would be :
<set>
<element>example</element>
</set>
As we can observe, the document’s exclusive canonicalization produces a canonical
form identical to the initial and intended form.
3.3.3 XMLdsig structure
An XML Signature element structure can be described with the following elements:
• SignedInfo
The SignedInfo Element is the root of the structure used to identify the methods
used in the verification of a given signature.
– CanonicalizationMethod
This method provides information for the transformation of the information
into a canonical form to be used in the signature operations.
– SignatureMethod
This element identifies the algorithm to convert the canonical form of the
element into the signature value. This method is a combination of an
Hashing algorithm and a signature algorithm such as RSA-SHA1.
– Reference
Each of the multiple reference elements that may be present includes in-
formation on the digest methods and corresponding result values over the
referenced data object.
• Transforms
The Transforms element is optional, and may contain a list of transform ele-
ments, passing the results through the different transform elements which contain
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the attribute defining the algorithm and respective content parameters operating
on the node set.
• DigestMethod
This element identifies the digest algorithm to be applied to the object being
signed.
• DigestValue
Containing the encoded value for the digest, the DigestValue element content is
encoded using Base64.
• SignatureValue
As the name implies, this element contains the final signature value encoded in
Base64.
• KeyInfo
This optional element enables the recipient of the document to obtain the key
required to validate the signature. This information may be composed of keys,
names, certificates or other public key management information required to
obtain the needed key. Since the element is optional and when this element
is not present, it is assumed that the party validating the document is able to
identify the needed key in the application context.
• Object
This element is typically used in enveloping signatures where the signed element
must be contained inside the signature element. The object’s id is referred from
a reference element either in the SignedInfo element or Manifest.
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<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod />
<SignatureMethod />
<Reference>
<Transforms>
<DigestMethod>
<DigestValue>
</Reference>
<Reference />
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue />
<KeyInfo />
<Object />
</Signature>
Code Block 3.1: ”xmlDsig structure”
An XML document may contain multiple signatures implying that multiple signature
tags may be present in the document. These signatures can be produced at different
times by different entities who may sign different elements. The widespread usage
of signed XML documents identified several problems with this signature specifica-
tion, namely the non-repudiation and long-term validity of signed documents. To
address these issues with the XML-dsig specification a new specification (XadES) was
developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute extending the
previous XMLDSIG specification.
3.3.4 XaDeS
The XML Advanced Electronics Signature specification defines different profiles that
can be used to sign XML documents extending the existing XMLDsig by providing
qualifying information and non-repudiation to the signature.
These profiles can be defined in levels. Each level not only inherits the requirements
of the parent but requires more information effectively adding stronger assurances to
the signed data.
The simpler form of XadeS profile adds the following elements to the previous spe-
cification:
• QualifyingProperties - Element containing the qualified properties, a sequence
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containing one or more elements of type SignedProperties and Unsigned Prop-
erties.
• SignedProperties - Element containing the signed qualified properties.
• SignedSignatureProperties - Element containing the properties that qualify the
XML signature specified with the Target attribute of QualifyingProperties.
• SigningTime - The SigningTime property specifies the time at which the signer
performed the signing process.
• SigningCertificate - This property contains references to certificates and digest
values computed on them, preventing the substitution of the certificate.
• SignaturePolicyIdentifier - The signature policy identifier is a signed property
qualifying thesignature.
• SignatureProductionPlace - Element that may contain the place where the signer
was at the time of signature creation.
• SignerRole - Signed property qualifying the signer, specifically the role in which
the signature was created.
• SignedDataObjectProperties -Ccollection of signed XML elements with proper-
ties individually qualifying signed data objects.
• DataObjectFormat - element providing information that describes the format of
the signed data object.
• CommitmentTypeIndication - Signed property qualifying the signed data objects,
specifying the commitment type.
• AllDataObjectsTimeStamp - Time-stamped ds:reference elements within Signed-
Info referencing whatever the signer wants to sign except the SignedProperties
element.
• IndividualDataObjectsTimeStamp - Element containing the time-stamp com-
puted before the signature production, over a sequence of some ds:Reference
elements within the SignedInfo element.
• UnsignedProperties - Element containing a number of properties not signed by
the XMLDsig signature.
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• UnsignedSignatureProperties - element that may contain properties that qualify
XML signature itself or the signer.
• CounterSignature - Element containing a counter-signature.
The described Xades profile provides integrity protection and basic authentication.
In order to offer stronger non-repudiation, five more profiles are defined by the spe-
cification.
• Timestamped (Xades-T)
This XML Advanced Electronic Signature profile includes a timestamp to ensure
non-repudiation by introducing a new element - SignatureTimeStamp. Produ-
cing a document with a timestamp requires therefore a TimeStamp Authority
(TSA) , binding the signature of the document to the date obtained from that
external entity.
• Complete (Xades-C)
This profile adds references to the required data supporting signature validation
such as certification path and revocation information.
• Extended (Xades-X)
The extended profile requires a timestamp either on the whole signature (as in
Xades-T) or in the information supporting signature validation (Xades-C). By
providing this possibility, the verifier can be assured that the information about
the certification path and revocation status was valid at the specific time the
timestamp was added to the document.
Assuming that a Certificate Authority can be compromised and its certificates
revoked, the timestamp established the validity of the signature by assuring that
the timestamp is earlier than the revocation event.
• Extended Long-Term (Xades-X-L)
Information required to validate documents may become obsolete on the long-
term. To solve this problem, this profile provides the possibility to add the
certification path and revocation data to the document ensuring that document
validity can be asserted in the long-term.
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• Archival (Xades-A)
This profile adds a timestamp to the information used by the Extended Long-
Term profile.
As computational power increases, keys and other cryptographic data may be-
come weak. The ability to ascertain the integrity in the archives requires, there-
fore, the ability to produce stronger signature over time. Xades-A considers this
problem and by providing the support to generate multiple stronger timestamps
guarantees that the integrity of the information to validate the signatures is not
compromised.
3.4 Marklogic Database
Marklogic[28] is a document-centric, transactional,search-centric, structure-aware and
schema-agnostic database server. Using XML document as its core data model and
providing XQuery and XSLT support, marklogic is a perfect tool for our architecture.
Although it is possible to retain the OracleSQL database, relational databases have
table-centric models having higher complexity with an obvious impact in performance.
Marklogic supports the full set of ACID properties:
• Atomicity - sets of changes only happen as a whole.
• Consistency - system rules are enforced so there are no colliding identifiers
between documents.
• Isolation - uncompleted transactions are not otherwise visible.
• Durability - once a transaction has been committed it will not be lost even in
the event of a power loss.
Indexing both text and structure, the two can be queried together efficiently facilitat-
ing search of highly structured documents.
3.5 Signserver
SignServer is an application framework performing cryptographic operations for other
applications. [8]. Based on loadable modules that perform a wide range of operations,
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this framework is able to perform signatures on different types of file formats,namely
PDF,XML,ODF,OOXML,MRTD,CMS and supports online document validation.
The modules can be used using HTTP or webservices interfaces.
The framework defines three different processable services:
• Signers - responsible for signing or otherwise processing the requested data.
• Validation services - services enabling the validation of a certificate against a set
of backed issuers.
• Group key service - framework enabling management and distribution of group
keys.
In order to perform sets of operations at defined intervals of time, the framework
provides plug-ins denominated Timed Services. PrimeKey’s sign server already sup-
ports different kinds of hardware security modules and PKCS#11 devices, thus provid-
ing the required flexibility to implement a HSM-backed signing module as denoted in
Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Signserver Framework architecture
While Primekey’s Signserver supports XML it did not support XaDeS with the XML
signature module supporting only xmlDsig. Since signserver is an opensource project,
the development of a new module providing the required XaDeS support not only is
possible but the modules source contained in the project can serve as the basis for
development.
CHAPTER 3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 34
The fact that signserver is an opensource project made it the inevitable choice for our
architecture, providing the ability to create complex modules aware of the in-house
trust-delegation chains which establish the trust anchors for any document.
3.6 HSM
A Hardware Security Module is a device containing one or more secure cryptopro-
cessors, providing strong authentication when accessing keys, secure key storage by
using tamper-resistant secure elements and accelerating cryptographic processes by
using dedicated hardware to oﬄoad the cryptographic operations from application
servers.
The private keys are generated on-board and remain irrecoverable inside the secure
elements, providing both logical and physical protection to the cryptographic keys.
Tamper protection is, therefore, a key element in Hardware Security Modules which
support a multi-part user authorization schema enforcing cooperation when dealing
with sensitive materials like private keys.
Physically protecting the keys in hardware requires a mix of techniques:
• Tamper Resistance - Packaging the hardware in a hardened shell casing, making
access to the inner parts difficult.
• Tamper Evidence - Protecting the device with seals and labels designed to
visually identify any attempt to open the device.
• Tamper Detection
Using a conductive mesh embedded with the packaging provides the internal cir-
cuits with a method to monitor different properties that would signal tampering.
• Tamper Response - Using an active response when tampering is detected, either
by logical destruction of data or, in military condition,s physical destruction of
both the equipment and data.
The HSM acquired by the University of Porto is Safenet’s Luna SA 5.0 , supporting
a PKCS#11 API and a wide range of cryptographic algorithms:
• Asymmetric: Diffie Hellman (1024-4096 bit) , RSA(512-8192 bit) , DSA (512-
1024 bit),ECDSA signing with over 50 standard curves.
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• Symmetric: 3DES,AES,RC2,RC4,RC5,CAST
• Hashing: MD2,MD5,SHA-1,SHA-2 (150,224,256,512 bit)
• Message Authentication Codes: HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256
In order to enforce division of operational roles, the HSM requires the use of PEM
keys in order to perform some management and maintenance operations:
• Security Officer - configure HSM and change device’s security policies.
• User/Partition owner - activate partitions and generate keys.
• Domain - control and define the security domain, replicate and backup keys.
• Remote PED Auth - assure logical trusted path to remote PED
• Tamper Recovery - recover from a tampered status, enable safe transport.
This HSM also provides mechanisms to avoid unilateral action by key holders by
allowing the requirement of multiple PEM keys to perform operations.
The application server is connected with the HSM using Network Trust Link using
four layers of security: IP Address, TLS with client authentication, Administrator
controled trust database and partition access password.
Figure 3.6 describes the overall architecture.
Figure 3.6: LUNA SA solution architecture
Chapter 4
Comparison with similar systems
Information systems have for long strived with the importance of document demater-
ialization as a means for cost-reduction.
While documents have been moving to digital archives, processes and document
work-flows had problems retaining the same level of trustworthiness as their physical
counterparts. To address this concern, multiple solutions have been proposed from
which we will explore in detail the University of Murcia e-government solution[29].
The coincidental similarity of the University of Murcia and our solution, provides a
good starting point to evaluate the differences and impact of both solutions in order
to achieve the main goals.
4.1 University of Murcia e-Government
The proposed solution by the University of Murcia intends to provide transaction
security and document management through a secure platform, by delivering two
groups of services.
4.1.1 Security Services
• Signature Service - This service provides the ability to sign and verify documents.
• Timestamp Service - In order to ascertain proof that a document existed at a
certain time, a timestamp service is provided.
36
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• Certificate Validation Service
The validation of certificates used in digital signatures is performed using this
service.
• Accounting Service - The accounting service is responsible for logging activities
of the previous services.
4.1.2 Documentary Management
The document management service set represents the group of services required for
secure generation, archive and query of documents while preserving electronic evid-
ences.
• Archiving Service - Stores electronic documents in the university documentary
database while assigning an unique identifier.
• Query Service - Locate and Retrieve documents using the unique identifier.
• Document Generation Service - A service for creating automatically documents.
4.1.3 Client Architectures
In order to generate signatures and perform authentication using the University of
Murcia Smartcard, client-side applications have been developed by the University of
Murcia. With cross-platform operation as a goal, the architecture supports both the
Windows Crypto API and CAPICOM within the Microsoft Windows environment and
PKCS#11 with NSS when using a Linux Operating System as depicted in Figure 4.1.
The UMU crypto-Applet verifies the client’s browser and operative system and provide
digital signature support using the MSCAPI Java provider or the NSS Provider
accordingly and transparently to the user.
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Figure 4.1: Client Architecture
Figure 4.1 displays the separation that occurs when using different browsers, this
approach requires the smartcard middleware to be previously installed and the use
of non standard methods to access the cryptographic interface. The CAPICOM [30]
interface is discontinued although as yet supported by most of Microsoft Operating
Systems.
4.1.4 Electronic Registry
The electronic registry provides the ability to send electronic documents and forms
to the University retaining the same level of trustworthiness as the physical registry.
This application intends to retain both authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation
properties of the transactions.
An example of such a transaction is shown in Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Sending an application form
The client fills and sign a form and sends to the application server. The application
server after validation and timestamping, records the form in the registry database
and delivers an acknowledgement of receipt. A previously sent form can be verified
by sending the acknowledgement receipt to the application server which verifies the
timestamp and signature, searches whether the form is present in the registry database
and returns the result to the client.
4.1.5 Electronic Marks Certificate
The electronic marks certificate service extends on the Electronic Registry to provide
professors the ability to perform marks certificates without having to deliver docu-
ments containing an handwritten signature. The electronic marks are created as an
XML document, signed by the professor, providing the ability to verify the authenticity
and integrity of each mark through the digital process.
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4.1.6 Analysis of solution
The solution implemented at the university of Murcia although providing a good
starting point to develop an environment for securing digital documents presents some
problems that must be addressed.
• Guaranteeing the long-term verifiability of the document author authorization to
produce the document - The document is produced with a context that may be
considered volatile, and cannot be easily audited in the future.
This problem arises when a user produces a colluding document which the
original author is unaware off, the document would be signed, timestamped
and archived. A future audit, if it does not possess a reliable information
source containing the authorized identity to produce the document, cannot
disambiguate which document is to be considered valid, since both authors had
valid certificates at the signing time.
• Non-repudation only for the author of a document - The effort to produce a
document receipt is not enough to provide mutual non-repudiation. A process
of dispute arbitration in which one of the challengers has set itself as the trusted
party is flawed by design. Mitigating this problem requires the presence of a
trusted third-party, with mutually agreed jurisdiction, producing signatures and
arbitrating disputes [31].
The receipt of acknowledgement, cannot provide mutual non-repudiation unless
a trusted third-party is relied upon.
Chapter 5
Proposal
The development of a system that can handle the identified problems while retain-
ing strong confidence of document integrity requires a careful workflow design and
architectural changes to the existing information system.
In Chapter 2 we introduced multiple risks that could lead to the untrustworthiness of
the system data. In order to minimize these risks a solution is described in detail with
sections identifying which problems are being tackled.
5.1 Document-Oriented Data
The information contained in the information system is document-oriented. Data
cannot be viewed as single fragmented piece of information mainly because it is mostly
produced in-context, structure-dependent and bound to other information blobs.
An example of such document relates to student grading,where each grade is bound
to a specific student, the document’s date, course, class and professor. Given that a
student can take the same class in different time periods and be evaluated more than
once by different professors, committing to such information’s trustworthiness implies
committing to the entire structure and not simply to the grade alone. Furthermore, a
grade can be attributed in multiple ways, such as an equivalence in a student mobility
program. Identifying the origin and legitimacy of such a document, requires not only
signed atomic data, but also information of the context in which it was produced.
Retaining such a document structure is not convenient when dealing with relational
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databases that imply the use of their formal data structures.
While the current information system materializes documents in order to retain this
structure information and trust, this physical support is expensive and workflow inef-
fective as workflow is concerned. To address this problem, a shift to XML documents
is required, that by their semi-structured nature provide us the ability to retain
the complex structures used during document production and by leveraging digital
signatures ascertain integrity and non-repudiation.
5.2 Data persistence
While the current information system stores its information in a relational database,
in the previous section problems were identified when using relational databases and a
solution that fits the specificity of the information system’s environment was provided.
The move to XML documents introduces a new requirement: XML document storage.
In order to address this requirement, a change in the overall architecture of the inform-
ation system was introduced, an XML database was added providing the information
system with the ability to store and operate over XML documents.
5.3 Document Trust
In subsection 2.3.3 we identified the threats leading to the loss of trust in document’s
integrity in the current system workflow. The move to XML documents requires,
therefore, that we can assure the integrity of every document stored in the database
and mitigate the risks that were also present in the previous scheme.
To trust the documents contained in the database we must retain the ability to:
• Authenticate the person who produced the document
• Provide non-repudiation of document’s authorship
• Assert that the document was not tampered with
• Assure that the document was produced in a given timeframe
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To address these requirements, the documents must be digitally signed by a certific-
ate, bound to the user (authentication, non-repudiation and integrity assurance) and
timestamped by an external entity to provide a trustable date source. While simple
documents can be produced in such a way, in an academic environment with shifting
hierarchies we must provide a method to assure that the given user was indeed acting
on behalf of the university when producing the given document. This delegation of
trust in the individual to produce a document requires another digital signature from
the institution itself assuring that at the time of document production a user was in
fact able to create such document.
Figure 5.1 describes the required properties in such a document:
Figure 5.1: Document Structure
Delegating trust is itself an anchor to the entire trust of the document and when
dealing with complex hierarchies entrusting a user to perform a given activity requires
a long chain of trust delegation. To cope with this problem, we must introduce a
document that can describe such trust chain.
5.4 Hierarchies and trust delegation
Trust delegation is implicit in the current information system as users are authentic-
ated by their credentials and attributed a set of roles that provide them with the ability
to perform a set of functions. Producing documents and assuring that the producer
had the legitimacy to perform it extends the trust past the document and requires
a trusted document describing the role assumed by the user. In order to simplify
the development process and minimize the impact of changing roles, the current roles
present in the system were assumed and defined in an XML document describing
CHAPTER 5. PROPOSAL 44
the user and his role. Documents describing this chained trust delegation are bound
together. This delegation chain can be observed in the following picture.
Figure 5.2: Trust delegation diagram
Validating a user’s role requires the recursive validation of delegations from the root
trust anchor to the delegation that entrusts the user with a given role. Since each
delegation document is itself signed, the integrity of the document can be guaranteed.
While this diagram of trust delegation is simplified it does not account for temporal
delegation, the documents produced contain the date the delegation takes effect and its
expiration date. A simplified delegation document describing this temporal delegation
can be exemplified the xml document in Code Block 5.1.
Roles are defined by complex types.
Delegated roles are context-dependent. In fact, not only a user can be delegated mul-
tiple roles but those roles can be context-specific. A professor assumes his delegated
role for a small subset of classes and attains this role by delegation from the director. A
user may assume, therefore, multiple roles which demands for example that a director
for instance is required to assign himself a set of roles by delegation in case he intends
to lecture a class.
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<delegation>
<delegate>
<user></user>
<role></role>
<starts></starts>
<expires></expires>
</delegate>
/∗ Signature nodes ∗/
</delegation>
Code Block 5.1: ”Delegation XML document”
The establishment of a role is generically described as traversing recursively the
institutional hierarchy. One example is presented in the diagram Figure 5.3
Figure 5.3: Delegation hierarchy
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5.5 Grading Documents
Dealing with trust sensitive documents and establishing document integrity through all
the document phases (creation, approval, distribution and archival) is a key aspect to
ensure the trustability of student records. In section 5.3 we identified the requirements
to produce a trusted document and the same principle applies to grading documents.
The grading document is therefore an XML document using the XML Advanced
Electronics Signature specification, namely XaDes-A as to provide support to long-
term archives.
An XML schema is included in the Apendix section describing a structure tying
students and the obtained grades and can be modified to different needs.
5.5.1 Professor Signatures
Asserting the authorship of a grading document is very important when assuming
that any system can be broken into or subverted in some way. Digital signatures
not only provide us with the required proof of authorship but also with the non-
repudiation property the document’s author cannot refute that he did not produce
such a document. Since professors are just temporarily assigned to a class, the
author cannot be able, at a later time (when the delegation has expired) to create
documents referring to the previous time-frame. To provide a stronger guarantee that
the document was in fact produced in the given timeframe, a timestamp is required
along with the document’s signature.
5.5.2 Institutional Signature
Documents signed only by the professor grading the student may be trustable enough
for the institution, but trust must be bidirectional. A professor may require that not
only he is bound to the document but also the institutions commits itself to the receipt
of the document. Institutional signatures provide the author of the document with
a guarantee of non-repudiation and acceptance from the institution. A institutional
signature commits the institution not only to the reception of the document but also
to the ability of the author to sign the document by assuring that the institution did
traverse the delegation chain and accepted the document, thus protecting the author.
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5.5.3 External Timestamp
A problem arises when observing that the university controls the entire infrastructure
such as the certificates for accepting documents, timestamp servers and so on. In order
to attain a stronger trust on the entire scheme and independence of a possible, although
improbable, full infrastructure compromise, a timestamp based on an external entity
can be used when signing the document with the institutional signature. Anchoring
the trust to an external entity which is independent of the institution’s public key
infrastructure and provides a timestamp for the document assures that the institution
cannot later subvert previous documents.
Chapter 6
Implementation
6.1 Architecture
The implementation of such a cryptographic scheme to retain document trustworthi-
ness requires deep architectural changes to the existing information system. Producing
client-side signatures requires a Java applet to be delivered to the user so he can
perform cryptographic operations on the documents also, a document repository has
to be included due to the insufficiency of the current database to store xml documents
and a signserver to perform server-side signatures.
In public key cryptography, the entire scheme relies on the security of the private
key. To address this concern, a Hardware Security Module is connected to the
signserver,thus protecting the private keys and performing cryptographic operations.
Figure 6.1: New Information system architecture
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In the architecture described in Figure 6.1, a separation of administrative domains
can be perceived. The information system (SIGARRA) has only direct read privileges
from the repository, although transitional write privileges are available by delivering
documents to be validated and institutionally signed, which are recorded into the
repository. This model provides a strong guarantee that documents in the repository
are approved and signed by the institution (offering non-repudiation to the author)
and ensures that documents cannot be removed by anyone with administrative rights
to the information system.
6.2 User Signatures
Signing a document with the university supplied smartcard requires client-side code
capable of using the smartcard’s private key. In order to provide support to client-
side signatures to XML documents, a Java applet with the ability to digitally sign
documents complying with the XML Advanced Electronics Signature specification
was developed.
6.2.1 Java Applet
In a complex system, it is not feasible to produce different applets for different contexts.
Taking into account that a single applet able to cope with all the contexts can be
developed, a more generic approach is devised, where different parameters related to
the workflow can be defined.
The applet takes these different parameters:
• Document
This parameter should contain the document that was generated by the inform-
ation system to be signed and is encoded in base64. The main reasoning behind
this encoding requirement is because XML documents may contain tags similar
to the ones used in the HTML page and, in order to avoid problems when
rendering such documents, encoding the document in base 64 is a reasonably
simple method for solving such cases.
• Signee
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This parameter contains the identifier to be matched against the certificates
unique name. While the information system may reject documents signed by
someone who didn’t have privileges to sign a document, users may, by mistake,
introduce a smartcard with a certificate not pertaining to themselves. Using this
parameter, the applet is able to match the expected signee with the certificate
ensuring that the user is indeed using the required smartcard.
• PostTO
The PostTO parameter contains the service that will be used to consume the
signed document. Different document types can be signed in different contexts
which have to obviously be signed by different web services.
The ability to provide a URL indicating where the applet should deliver the
signed documents is an approach that provides a generic method to reuse the
same applet in different contexts.
In a typical usage scenario, the web server generates a document containing an applet
and the parameters above.
The initialization of the applet takes into account the parameters contained in the
generated HTML and initializes the internal variables.
@Override
public void init() {
xmlDOC = this.getParameter(”xmlDoc”);
postTO= this.getParameter(”postTO”);
signeeUN = this.getParameter(”SigneeUN”);
}
Code Block 6.1: Applet Initialization
The document base64 encoded and passed as a parameter to the applet, which requires
the XML to be decoded from the parameter..
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/∗
(...)
xmlDOC = this.getParameter(”xmlDoc”);
(...)
∗/
public Document decodeB64Document() throws SAXException,
ParserConfigurationException, IOException{
Document doc = null;
byte decoded[] = Base64.decode(xmlDOC);
InputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(decoded);
DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setNamespaceAware(true);
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
doc = builder.parse(in);
return doc;
}
Code Block 6.2: Decoding XML document
Signing a document requires the instantiation of a XadesSigner as in
Code Block 6.3 where a BES profile is being used.
public XadesSigner XadesBESSign() throws XadesProfileResolutionException{
KeyingDataProvider kdp = getPKCS11rovider(new certSelector(signeeUN),
new passwordProvider(), new keyEntryProvider());
XadesBesSigningProfile xbp= new XadesBesSigningProfile(kdp);
xbp.withSignaturePropertiesProvider(signatureProperties.class)
.withAlgorithmsProvider(myProvider.class);
return xbp.newSigner();
}
Code Block 6.3: Xades-BES profile
In order to sign a document, we are required to define which kind of Xades signature
we intend to perform. We defined a Enveloped signature to provide self-contained
XML documents.
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public void signFile(Document doc) throws XAdES4jException, ProviderException {
XadesSigner xs = XadesBESSign();
Node n = doc.getDocumentElement();
SignedDataObjects dataObjs = new SignedDataObjects(
new EnvelopedXmlObject(n)).withCommitmentType(
AllDataObjsCommitmentTypeProperty.proofOfApproval());
xs.sign(dataObjs,doc);
sendTo(postTO,doc);
}
Code Block 6.4: Signing a Document
Signed documents as observed in Code Block 6.4 are sent to the URL defined in the
postTO applet parameter.
public void sendTo(String postTO, Document doc)
throws IOException,ParseException,TransformerException {
ByteArrayInputStream inputStream = null;
HttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient();
httpclient.getParams().setParameter(CoreProtocolPNames.PROTOCOL VERSION,
HttpVersion.HTTP 1 1);
HttpPost httppost = new HttpPost(postTO);
MultipartEntity mpEntity = new MultipartEntity();
Writer writer = new StringWriter();
TransformerFactory tf = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
tf.newTransformer().transform(new DOMSource(doc), new StreamResult(writer));
inputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(writer.toString().getBytes(”UTF−8”));
ContentBody cbody = new InputStreamBody(inputStream,”file”);
mpEntity.addPart(”File”, cbody);
httppost.setEntity(mpEntity);
String response = EntityUtils.toString( httpclient.execute( httppost ).getEntity(), ”
UTF−8” );
httpclient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();
}
Code Block 6.5: Uploading a document
Smartcards require middleware to operate,but in order to avoid problems such as
requiring the user to have previously installed the smartcard’s middleware, the ap-
plet can identify the operative system and its architecture obtaining the middleware
online without the user’s intervention. Currently, the supported cards are both the
Portuguese National identity card and the university card.
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6.3 Signserver
PrimeKey’s signserver did not support XaDes signatures at the time the implement-
ation started. In order to solve this issue, a XadeS signer module which can per-
form HSM-supported XaDes signatures with different profiles was developed and
subsequently adopted by Primekey ??.
Signserver exposes three different kinds of processable services:
• Signers
Responsible for processing requested data and performing signatures
• Validation Services
Service that provides the capability to validate a signed document’s certificate
against a set of backed issuers.
• Group key service framework
Service that manages and distributes group keys for different applications.
Our solution requires implementation of both the signer service and validation service
in order to provide an effective method for signing documents as well as validating
signed documents.
The creation of a service in signserver is as simple as extending the base signer class.
public class XadesSigner extends BaseSigner{
@Override
public void init(int signerId, WorkerConfig config,
WorkerContext workerContext, EntityManager workerEntityManager) {
}
@Override
public ProcessResponse processData(ProcessRequest signRequest, RequestContext
requestContext) throws IllegalRequestException, CryptoTokenOﬄineException,
SignServerException {
}
}
Code Block 6.6: Extending Base Signer
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In order to perform XaDes signatures with different profiles the xades4j library was
selected due to its open source nature and support of different XadeS profiles.
Configuration follows the same principle as with other signserver services. When using
a generic signer supporting XaDes,the configuration of the profile to be used in the
signature process is required and the following properties are recognized by the signer:
• XADESFORM
This property defines which XaDes profile is used by the signer instance to
perform the signature. Currently this property can have the following values
BES,C,EPES and T.
• TSA URL
Using a profile that requires a timestamp to be obtained, makes this property
required. The TSA URL string is used as a timestamp URL.
• TSA USERNAME
This property defines the username to be used when TSA authentication is
required. It defaults to non-authenticated if the property is not set.
• TSA PASSWORD
This property sets the passwords to be used with the username if set. Defaults
to null otherwise.
• MARKLOGIC URL
The MARKLOGIC URL property when set, provides signed documents archival
in a mark logic database. When the property is not set, the signer does not
archive the document and simply returns the signed version to the requester.
• MARKLOGIC PORT
The Marklogic’s server port can be set with this property. Required if MARK-
LOGIC URL is set.
• MARKLOGIC USER
The property establishes the username to be used in the database authentication
process. Required if MARKLOGIC URL is set.
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• MARKLOGIC PASSWORD
The password to be paired with the username. Required if MARKLOGIC URL
is set.
As previously described, the signers take multiple configurable parameters defined in
a property file.
# Example Xades Signer configuration
GLOB.WORKERGENID1.CLASSPATH = org.signserver.module.xadessinger.XadesSigner
#GLOB.WORKERGENID1.SIGNERTOKEN.CLASSPATH = org.signserver.server.cryptotokens.
SoftCryptoToken
## General properties
WORKERGENID1.NAME=XadesSigner
WORKERGENID1.AUTHTYPE=NOAUTH
#XADESFORM can be BES,C,EPES,T
WORKERGENID1.XADESFORM=T
#(required if implicit in xades profile)
WORKERGENID1.TSA URL=http://localhost:8080/signserver/tsa?workerName\=TSA
#optional
#WORKERGENID1.TSA USERNAME=
#optional
#WORKERGENID1.TSA PASSWORD=
#optional
#WORKERGENID1.MARKLOGIC URL=
#WORKERGENID1.MARKLOGIC USER=
#WORKERGENID1.MARKLOGIC PASSWORD=
Code Block 6.7: Sample Configuration
Although a generic implementation was developed in order to contribute with patches
to the sign server project, a specific signer and validator aware of our dynamic trust
delegation chains is required. While performing an institutional signature committing
to the validity of a document, the verification of document’s authorship while estab-
lishing the author’s permission to produce the document is of extreme importance.
An approved and institutionally signed document cannot be refuted, and it is bound
to the institution’s reputation.
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In order to facilitate this verification, two validators were developed for the documents:
• Intermediate Document Validator
It validates documents that do not contain institutional signatures.
The document’s integrity is verified using the signatures present in the docu-
ment and using the document representing the delegation chain. The validator
recursively verifies the delegations until the main trust anchor is reached.
Documents which do not provide at least a signature from a trusted signee are
rejected as invalid.
• Final Document Validator
Final documents are required to contain institutional signatures.
The document’s signatures are validated using the intermediate documents ser-
vice and, if a positive response is obtained, a signature containing the institu-
tion’s certificate in the document is searched before establishing the document’s
validity.
The validators are extended from the BaseValidator class as described in Code Block 6.8
class XadesValidator extends BaseValidator {
public ProcessResponse processData(ProcessRequest signRequest, RequestContext
requestContext) throws IllegalRequestException, CryptoTokenOﬄineException,
SignServerException {
}
private GenericValidationResponse validate(final int requestId, byte[] data) throws
SignServerException {
}
Code Block 6.8: Extending Base Signer
The full validator responsible for verifying if a document was accepted by the institu-
tion (contains a valid institutional certificate) is available in Appendix B.
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6.4 Differences with University of Murcia Frame-
work
In subsection 4.1.6 we identified some problems with the architecture of the University
of Murcia solution. In order to guarantee that an author’s ability to produce a given
document is verifiable in long-term archives, instead of relying on volatile permissions
recorded in the information system, we designed a method for delegating trust for
each user and role. By using signed documents guaranteeing long-term integrity and
verifiability we provide an effective mechanism which also allows authors to delegate
tasks while retaining audit capabilities.
Another problem identified in the University of Murcia framework pertains to the
absence of a trusted third-party and the impossibility to have mutual non-repudiation.
To address this concern, our proposal includes a timestamp obtained from an external
entity. An external timestamp, anchors a third-party to the document’s production,
guaranteeing non-repudiation of its existence.
A specific implementation concern is the method for producing digital signatures
client-side. Using Microsoft deprecated CAPICOM and highly browser-specific im-
plementations may lead to a set of problems. Providing a PKCS#11-based cross-
platform solution based on Java Applets seems a better fit, smartcard middleware
could be loaded dynamically from online sources, and the maintenance of a single
Applet is less error-prone.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The development in the information system is critical, prone to bureaucracy and,
unfortunately, fragmented, resulting in a longer project for completion. To solve these
problems, a similar system following the document’s workflow was created as a proof
of concept, providing a mechanism to test delegation attribution, student evaluation
and document signatures, as well as institutional signatures, document archive and
validators for generated documents.
While the objective of integrating the architectural changes to the current information
system was not concluded, a few problems that require changes in the university itself
were identified. Although it was reasonably assumed that the actors who perform
given tasks are well identified, some roles such as who can sign a given document
are not well defined (as when directors can sign grades for invited professors). Each
faculty inside the university may delegate the tasks to different persons and while
our delegation chain could cope with delegations, establishing trusted anchors would
require some effort). Also, in some cases, documents can be signed by a superior, thus
bypassing the actual document creator. Although we can provide an inheritance mech-
anism to our delegation chain, it subverts the non-repudiation property of document’s
authorship,which invalidates the general scheme for different faculties (inheriting trust
due to group roles).
The proof of concept was comprised by a set of web services and front-end controllers
which emulate the workflow of the grading process. A trusted anchor could delegate
evaluation tasks to professors who then could evaluate students by producing the
grading documents, that, after being institutionally signed, would be archived in the
XML database.
58
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 59
The produced documents were validated and inspected to ascertain conformity with
the specification.
Different attacks were performed as to establish the information system ability to
detect manipulated documents, as well as revoked trust delegations and expired cer-
tificates.
Chapter 8
Future Work
During the research and development of this architecture, a new method for docu-
ment dematerialization was drafted in order to facilitate information sharing across
institutions. While XML provides the most efficient way to share information across
information systems, legacy systems must be taken into account. XML signatures
are not easily validated outside the scope of an information system and they do not
provide a visual representation per se.
To solve the problem of information sharing with institutions that still rely on older
mechanisms, providing an embedded XML inside an institutionally signed PDF doc-
ument with a visual representation of the given XML can support an easier oﬄine
document verification in a legacy environment. While this draft was published [7]
the supporting mechanism for such a schema remain unimplemented and could rep-
resent an important step into adoption of different trusted document models across
institutions.
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Appendix A
XaDeS Signing Module
package org.signserver.module.xadessigner;
import com.marklogic.client.DatabaseClient;
import com.marklogic.client.DatabaseClientFactory;
import com.marklogic.client.document.XMLDocumentManager;
import com.marklogic.client.io.DOMHandle;
import com.marklogic.client.io.XMLStreamReaderHandle;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
import java.util.Date;
import java.util.logging.Level;
import javax.persistence.EntityManager;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
import javax.xml.stream.XMLStreamReader;
import javax.xml.transform.Transformer;
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerConfigurationException;
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerException;
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory;
import javax.xml.transform.dom.DOMSource;
import javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamResult;
import org.signserver.common.CryptoTokenOﬄineException;
import org.signserver.common.IllegalRequestException;
import org.signserver.common.ProcessRequest;
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import org.signserver.common.ProcessResponse;
import org.signserver.common.RequestContext;
import org.signserver.common.SignServerException;
import org.signserver.server.signers.BaseSigner;
import org.apache.log4j.Logger;
import org.bouncycastle.util.encoders.Hex;
import org.ejbca.util.CertTools;
import org.signserver.common.ArchiveData;
import org.signserver.common.GenericServletRequest;
import org.signserver.common.GenericServletResponse;
import org.signserver.common.GenericSignRequest;
import org.signserver.common.GenericSignResponse;
import org.signserver.common.ISignRequest;
import org.signserver.common.WorkerConfig;
import org.signserver.server.WorkerContext;
import org.signserver.server.cryptotokens.ICryptoToken;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Element;
import org.w3c.dom.Node;
import org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import xades4j.XAdES4jException;
import xades4j.production.Enveloped;
import xades4j.production.EnvelopedXmlObject;
import xades4j.production.SignedDataObjects;
import xades4j.production.XadesBesSigningProfile;
import xades4j.production.XadesCSigningProfile;
import xades4j.production.XadesSigningProfile;
import xades4j.production.XadesTSigningProfile;
import xades4j.properties.AllDataObjsCommitmentTypeProperty;
import xades4j.providers.KeyingDataProvider;
import xades4j.providers.impl.DirectKeyingDataProvider;
import xades4j.utils.XadesProfileResolutionException;
import xades4j.providers.impl.TimeStampProvider;
/∗∗
∗
∗ @author Luis Maia <lmaia@dcc.fc.up.pt>
∗/
public class XadesSigner extends BaseSigner{
private static final Logger LOG = Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class);;
static String XADESFORMDEFAULT=”BES”;
static String XADESFORM=”XADESFORM”;
static String TSA URL=”TSA URL”;
static String TSA USERNAME=”TSA USERNAME”;
static String TSA PASSWORD=”TSA PASSWORD”;
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public static final String DEFAULT ARCHIVETODISK FILENAME PATTERN = ”${
WORKERID}−${REQUESTID}−${DATE:HHmmssSSS}.pdf”;
/∗ Supported Xades Profiles∗/
public enum Profiles {
BES,
C,
EPES,
T
}
@Override
public void init(int signerId, WorkerConfig config,
WorkerContext workerContext, EntityManager workerEntityManager) {
super.init(signerId, config, workerContext, workerEntityManager);
}
@Override
public ProcessResponse processData(ProcessRequest signRequest, RequestContext
requestContext) throws IllegalRequestException, CryptoTokenOﬄineException,
SignServerException {
ProcessResponse signResponse;
ISignRequest sReq = (ISignRequest) signRequest;
// Check that the request contains a valid GenericSignRequest object with a byte[].
if (!(signRequest instanceof GenericSignRequest)) {
throw new IllegalRequestException(”Recieved request wasn’t a expected
GenericSignRequest.”);
}
if (!(sReq.getRequestData() instanceof byte[])) {
throw new IllegalRequestException(”Recieved request data wasn’t a expected byte[].
”);
}
byte[] data = (byte[]) sReq.getRequestData();
/∗SHA1 fingerprint for the request returned∗/
byte[] fpbytes = CertTools.generateSHA1Fingerprint(data);
String fp = new String(Hex.encode(fpbytes));
XadesSignerParameters params = new XadesSignerParameters(workerId, config);
xades4j.production.XadesSigner xs=null;
Document doc = null;
try {
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xs = XadesSign(params);
DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setNamespaceAware(true);
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
doc = builder.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(data));
if(!validateSignees(doc))
{
throw new IllegalRequestException(”Invalid Signer in document.”);
}
Node n = doc.getDocumentElement();
SignedDataObjects dataObjs = new SignedDataObjects(new EnvelopedXmlObject(n))
.withCommitmentType(AllDataObjsCommitmentTypeProperty.proofOfApproval()
);
xs.sign(dataObjs,doc);
} catch (SAXException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (IOException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (ParserConfigurationException ex) {
throw new SignServerException(”Document parsing error”, ex);
} catch (XadesProfileResolutionException ex) {
throw new SignServerException(”Exception in Xades Profile Resolution”, ex);
} catch (XAdES4jException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
TransformerFactory tf = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
Transformer trans;
try {
trans = tf.newTransformer();
trans.transform(new DOMSource(doc), new StreamResult(bout));
/∗Do the archiving∗/
archive(doc,params.getMarkLogicParameters(),sReq.getRequestID());
} catch (TransformerException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
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}
final byte[] signedbytes = bout.toByteArray();
if (signRequest instanceof GenericServletRequest) {
signResponse = new GenericServletResponse(sReq.getRequestID(), signedbytes,
getSigningCertificate(), fp, new ArchiveData(signedbytes), ”text/xml”);
} else {
signResponse = new GenericSignResponse(sReq.getRequestID(), signedbytes,
getSigningCertificate(), fp, new ArchiveData(signedbytes));
}
return signResponse;
}
public xades4j.production.XadesSigner XadesSign(XadesSignerParameters params) throws
XadesProfileResolutionException, SignServerException{
KeyingDataProvider kdp=null;
try {
kdp = new DirectKeyingDataProvider((X509Certificate)this.getSigningCertificate(), this.
getCryptoToken().getPrivateKey(ICryptoToken.PURPOSE SIGN));
} catch (CryptoTokenOﬄineException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesSigner.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
}
Profiles config profile = Profiles.valueOf(params.getXadesForm());
XadesSigningProfile xsp=null;
switch(config profile){
case C:
//unimplemented yet
case EPES:
//unimplemented yet
case BES:
xsp = new XadesBesSigningProfile(kdp);
break;
case T:
TSAParameters tsaParameters = params.getTSAParameters();
if(tsaParameters==null){
throw new SignServerException(”TSA URL is required to use the ”+
config profile.toString()+” Profile”);
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}
xsp = new XadesTSigningProfile(kdp)
.withTimeStampTokenProvider(TimeStampProvider.class)
.withBinding(TSAParameters.class, params.getTSAParameters());
break;
default:
throw new XadesProfileResolutionException(”Unknown Xades Profile”, null);
}
return (xades4j.production.XadesSigner) xsp.newSigner();
}
private void archive(Document doc,MarkLogicParameters params,int requestID) {
if(params!=null){
DatabaseClient dbclient = DatabaseClientFactory.newClient(params.getURL(),
params.getPort(), params.getUsername(), params.getPassword(),
DatabaseClientFactory.Authentication.DIGEST);
XMLDocumentManager docMgr = dbclient.newXMLDocumentManager();
DOMHandle domHandle = new DOMHandle();
domHandle.set(doc);
/∗Create a docID ∗/
final SimpleDateFormat sdf = new SimpleDateFormat(”yyyy MM dd”);
String data = sdf.format(new Date());
String URI = ”/XadesSigner/”+workerId+”−”+requestID+”−”+data;
docMgr.write(URI,domHandle);
dbclient.release();
}
}
}
Appendix B
XaDeS validator Module
package org.signserver.module.xadesvalidator;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.security.KeyStore;
import java.security.KeyStoreException;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.NoSuchProviderException;
import java.security.cert.CertificateException;
import java.util.logging.Level;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
import org.apache.log4j.Logger;
import org.apache.xml.security.utils.Constants;
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x500.RDN;
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x500.X500Name;
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x500.style.BCStyle;
import org.bouncycastle.cert.jcajce.JcaX509CertificateHolder;
import org.signserver.common.CryptoTokenOﬄineException;
import org.signserver.common.GenericServletRequest;
import org.signserver.common.GenericValidationRequest;
import org.signserver.common.GenericValidationResponse;
import org.signserver.common.IValidationRequest;
import org.signserver.common.IllegalRequestException;
import org.signserver.common.ProcessRequest;
import org.signserver.common.ProcessResponse;
import org.signserver.common.RequestContext;
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import org.signserver.common.SignServerException;
import org.signserver.server.validators.BaseValidator;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Element;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
import org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import xades4j.XAdES4jException;
import xades4j.providers.CertificateValidationProvider;
import xades4j.providers.impl.PKIXCertificateValidationProvider;
import xades4j.verification.XAdESVerificationResult;
import xades4j.verification.XadesVerificationProfile;
import xades4j.verification.XadesVerifier;
/∗∗
∗ lmaia@dcc.fc.up.pt
∗/
public class XadesValidator extends BaseValidator {
/∗∗ Logger. ∗/
private static final Logger LOG = Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class);
public ProcessResponse processData(ProcessRequest signRequest, RequestContext
requestContext) throws IllegalRequestException, CryptoTokenOﬄineException,
SignServerException {
// Check that the request contains a valid GenericSignRequest object with a byte[].
if (!(signRequest instanceof GenericValidationRequest)) {
throw new IllegalRequestException(”Recieved request wasn’t a expected
GenericValidationRequest.”);
}
IValidationRequest sReq = (IValidationRequest) signRequest;
if (!(sReq.getRequestData() instanceof byte[])) {
throw new IllegalRequestException(”Recieved request data wasn’t a expected byte[].”);
}
if (signRequest instanceof GenericServletRequest) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(”GenericServletRequest not yet supported”);
}
byte[] data = (byte[]) sReq.getRequestData();
GenericValidationResponse response = validate(sReq.getRequestID(), data);
return response;
}
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private GenericValidationResponse validate(final int requestId, byte[] data) throws
SignServerException {
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setNamespaceAware(true);
try {
DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
factory.setNamespaceAware(true);
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
Document doc = builder.parse(new ByteArrayInputStream(data));
KeyStore truststore = KeyStore.getInstance(KeyStore.getDefaultType());
char[] password = getConfig().getProperty(”TRUSTSTOREPASSWORD”).
toCharArray();
java.io.FileInputStream fis =
new java.io.FileInputStream(getConfig().getProperty(”TRUSTSTOREPATH”)
);
truststore.load(fis, password);
fis.close();
CertificateValidationProvider cvp = new PKIXCertificateValidationProvider(truststore
, false);
XadesVerificationProfile p = new XadesVerificationProfile(cvp);
XadesVerifier xv = p.newVerifier();
NodeList nl = doc.getElementsByTagNameNS(Constants.SignatureSpecNS, Constants.
TAG SIGNATURE);
if(nl.getLength()==0){
return new GenericValidationResponse(requestId, false);
}
String signees = ””;
boolean isSignedbyServer = false;
for(int i=0;i<nl.getLength();i++){
Element sigElement= (Element) nl.item(i);
XAdESVerificationResult r = xv.verify(sigElement,null);
X500Name x500name = new JcaX509CertificateHolder(r.getValidationCertificate()).
getSubject();
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RDN[] rdn = x500name.getRDNs(BCStyle.CN);
String cn = rdn[0].getFirst().getValue().toString();
if(cn.equalsIgnoreCase(”Signature Service”)) //since we are ”pinning” certs this is
OUR cert
{
isSignedbyServer=true;
}
}
return new GenericValidationResponse(requestId, isSignedbyServer);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (CertificateException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (KeyStoreException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (XAdES4jException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
}catch (NoSuchProviderException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesValidator.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (SAXException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesVerifier.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (IOException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesVerifier.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
} catch (ParserConfigurationException ex) {
java.util.logging.Logger.getLogger(XadesVerifier.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
}
//any error ocurring means the document is NOT properly validated (false)
return new GenericValidationResponse(requestId, false);
}
}
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